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Enabling Software Acquisition Improvement: 
Government and Industry Software Development 
Team Acquisition Model  
Joe Heil—Joe W. Heil has worked as a Software Engineer for the Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for over 23 years. The majority of Mr. Heil's career was spent as the 
Software Integrated Product Team Lead for the Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS). As the 
TTWCS SW IPT lead, he was responsible for defining the software development processes and 
coordinating the software development efforts for the TTWCS integrated Industry and Government 
software development team. Mr. Heil is currently the Senior Software Engineer for the NSWCDD 
Strategic and Weapons Control Systems Department (K) and is focused on improving software 
engineering, development, and acquisition. 
Abstract 
The growth, complexity, and reliance on software (SW) as part of the Department of 
Defense and Navy (DoD/Navy) warfare systems is continuing to increase. This increase in 
SW complexity and reliance has been accompanied by an increase in well documented SW 
intensive system acquisition cost, schedule and technical performance failures. The 
DoD/Navy is not consistently performing as a smart buyer of software intensive systems. 
The government and private industry have not been successful in applying the latest 
software methodologies and technologies nor consistently providing high quality and reliable 
systems that are delivered on schedule and within budget.  The typical acquisition approach 
utilized over the past several decades of relying  primarily on private industry for 
architecting, designing and implementing SW intensive systems has resulted in the loss of 
government in-house applied SW expertise necessary to achieve truly open architected 
systems and systems-of-systems. 
The key enablers for improving SW intensive system acquisition are the 
reconstitution and utilization of government in-house software subject matter experts 
(SMES) that can lead and work with industry SW engineers as part of an integrated SW 
















Current State: SW Technical Challenges 
There are numerous technical challenges associated with the growth and reliance on 
software within the DoD/Navy’s mission critical warfare systems such as: 
 Designing and implementing truly Open Architected systems that fully meet the 
goals of standardized interfaces, scalability, reliability, portability, modularity and 
reusability; and thereby lead to higher system quality while also reducing cost 
and schedule.   
 Assessing, successfully utilizing, and rapidly integrating the most advanced 
software technologies and methodologies such as Model Driven Architectures, 
Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), multi-core parallel processing, automated 
code generation, cloud computing, next generation programming languages, and 
agile development processes. 
  Integrating the mix of legacy SW components, new Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) SW components and DoD/Navy developed highly specialized and 
unique SW components to provide integrated net-centric systems composed of 
hundreds-of-millions (possibly billions) of lines of code that can execute as 
systems-of-systems and fully meet mission level objectives and Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPS).   
 Achieving Information Assurance (IA) and protection against SW-based Cyber-
Attacks while trying to maximize COTS utilization and Net-Centric 
communications.  
 Maintaining government corporate knowledge of the system architecture, design 
and technology utilization as the responsibility for system and software 
development transitions among different private industry organizations during the 
program lifecycle.   
In order to address the SW engineering and development technical challenges listed 
above, as well as many not listed here, it is imperative that the government maintain the 
applied software technical experts that can serve as both leaders and team-mates with peer 
industry software engineers.  
Current State: Acquisition Approach 
Figures 2 and 3 provide high level models with a rough indication of the relative 
involvement of government versus industry technical experts and the typical acquisition 
approach utilized for SW Intensive system acquisition and development. Government 
engineers are primarily used during the initial system concept, system level requirement 
phase, and system validation phase of the acquisition process. In the initial stage of system 
acquisition, the government system engineers define the capability need and the associated 
highest level system requirements and key performance parameters (KPPs).  During the 
initial phase, government system engineers may work with multiple Industry organizations to 
perform Technical Assessment of Alternatives (AoA) where industry provide prototypes or 
advanced technology demonstrations (often proprietary) advertised to fully meet the system 
capability needs and can be developed in a timely and cost effective manner.   
The government then relies almost entirely on Industry technical experts for the 
detailed system and software architecting, designing, coding and software level integration 





almost entirely by Industry.  Government insight into the detailed software architecture and 
design is primarily via the utilization of milestone reviews (System Requirement Reviews 
(SRRs), Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs), etc.). The government then takes the lead for 
System Integration, Testing and Certification. And as described in the next section, this 
























Figure 3. Current Acquisition Approach 
Current State: Results 
The increase in DoD/Navy SW intensive warfare system cost, schedule, and 
technical performance failures over the past 20 years are well documented in numerous 
reports and studies from organizations such as the Defense Science Board (DSB), the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Crosstalk, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Research Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA). Figure 4 summarizes some of the key 
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The November 2002 Report of the DSB Task Force on Defense Software reported:  
 Only 16% of programs are completed on schedule and within budget 
 Up to 31% of programs are cancelled and the remaining 53% have cost growth 
greater than 89% 
 The average final product includes only 61% of the original intended features. 
 
Figure 4. DoD Software System Acquisition Report Findings 
In 2004, the GAO reported that the DoD spent 40% of its software development 
budget reworking software because of quality related issues (GAO, 2004). In 2008 the DSB 
reported that the majority of DoD weapons systems are failing Initial Operational Testing. In 
2008, the ASN/RDA SPII SAM focus team published a report that documented the following 
critical problems that apply to the vast majority of DoD/Navy SW program acquisition offices:  
 Lack of effective management. 
 Immature acquirer (program offices). 
 Ineffective requirements management. 
 High personnel turnover. 
 Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates. 
 Ineffective utilization of Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) for SW. 
 Failure to utilize of lessons learned. 
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DOD/Navy SW Acquisition Strategy Results
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 (1) “Over time, in-house offices of subject matter experts were drastically reduced, and in some cases, disestablished”; (2) “Finally, there 
  was a loss of a large number of the most experienced management and technical personnel in Government and industry  without an   
3.   adequate replacement pipeline”; (3) “Many IOT&E failures have been due to lack of operational suitability.”    


















In 2009, Senator Carl Levin reported that since 2006 nearly half of the DoD’s largest 
acquisition programs have exceeded Nun-McCurdy, and that 95 major defense programs 
have had their acquisition costs grow by an average of 26% and have experienced an 
average schedule delay of almost 2 years.  
The DoD has lost the ability and expertise required to consistently successfully team 
with industry to acquire SW intensive weapon systems on time and within budget.
Current State: The Devil Is in the Details 
Although software has evolved into one of the most complex and critical elements of 
mission critical systems, the typical DoD/Navy acquisition strategy tends to treat the 
software components as black boxes with the internal software architecture and design 
development (and understanding) left almost entirely in the hands of private industry 
software engineers. As shown in Figure 5, a typical SW system may include: 
 Hundreds to thousands of system level requirements, 
 Thousands to tens-of thousands software level requirements, 
 Tens to hundreds of external system interfaces, 
 Hundreds to tens of thousands computer software components (CSCs), 
 Thousands-to tens of thousands internal software interfaces and interactions,  
 Millions to hundreds of millions of logic threads, 
 Millions to hundreds of millions of source lines of code (SLOC), and 
 Billions of software characters. 
And note that all it takes is for single erroneous character within the millions of lines 
of SW to cause a total system failure. 
17
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One of the most significant challenges facing the DoD/Navy’s complex software 
intensive system acquisition is the rapid rate of change associated with software 
technologies, methodologies, processes, processors, and tools.  In order for program office 
leadership to successfully maintain existing software systems, and acquire new software 
systems, it is imperative that they have access to in-house technical experts that have 
applied expertise with both the older software environments and the latest cutting edge 
software technologies and environments.  
In addition to having experience working with the latest software technologies, 
Government in-house software engineers must also be able to apply these technologies to 
the unique, complex, and challenging context of Navy system functional requirements (e.g., 
time critical processing, real-time processing, numerous external and internal hardware and 
software interfaces, complex algorithms, safety critical, and nuclear critical).  The current 
typical acquisition approach limits the government’s technical understanding to a few pages 
of high level system and software architecture diagrams, and understanding and 
“controlling” the interfaces between the software components only at the highest level of 
system abstraction, the Government is not able to maintain corporate technical expertise 
required to successfully acquire software intensive systems. 
The allocation of all the software architecture, design, code, and test responsibility to 
private industry is causing the government to lose the applied SW development experience 
and expertise to consistently successfully perform all of the following critical software system 
intensive acquisition activities: 
 Maintain awareness and expertise in modern SW technologies and 
methodologies necessary to understand when/if/how these new technologies 
should be utilized; 
 Assess industry’s technical approaches, and also provide government developed 
technical approaches; 
 Evaluate industry’s technical cost and schedule estimates; 
 Ensure Open Architecture (OA) design and verify that the OA design is actually 
implemented in the SW code; 
 Fully understand the technical, cost, and schedule impacts of requirement 
changes 
 Define and manage SW EVMS; 
 Define and utilize SW metrics-based control processes; and 
 Identify and manage software risks. 
Architecting and designing only at the higher levels of system abstraction (i.e., 
segment, component, and functional domain) is not sufficient for the government to maintain 
applied SW expertise. The amount of required expertise, experience, and effort required to 
successfully architect and design the software components increases at each lower level of 
system decomposition. An applied in-depth understanding of software technologies and 
methodologies is necessary to architect, design, and implement the software components at 
the CSCI level and below.  The government must understand the sub-component SW 
elements to successfully address the following technical challenges: 
 Asynchronous real-time event processing, 





 Safety Critical requirements, 
 Anti-Tampering and Information Assurance protection, 
 Data Security/Classification protection and segregation, 
 24/7 system reliability and system accessibility, and 
 Protection against Cyber-Attacks. 
The typical acquisition approach of Milestone reviews provide too little insight and 
occur too late in the acquisition schedule as the damage has already been done. Many 
“design” reviews now focus more on compliance to SW processes versus actually providing 
an in-depth review of the SW architecture/design/code. Even if private industry provides a 
detailed and thorough presentation of their software architecture and design at the milestone 
reviews, the government typically, except for a few rare cases, lacks the applied in-house 
software experience and expertise to ensure the software components meet all OA 
objectives including modularity, scalability, reliability, maintainability, and quality; and ensure 
the implementation artifacts (code) and design artifacts remain consistent with each other.  If 
the government identifies any significant technical software architecture or design issues 
during the milestone review, the contractor typically responds with such severe cost and 
schedule impacts that often the only option left is to trade-off planned new capabilities for 
significant architecture and design corrections. 
 Some software intensive programs utilize government in-house software 
engineers to participate with industry during software development. This participation is 
typically via peer-review during design and code activities. This approach assumes that 
Government software engineers will be willing to review other engineer’s work rather than 
being responsible for designing and coding software components themselves. The 
government cannot attract the best talent, nor sustain highly motivated and high quality 
software SMEs by limiting their tasking to looking-over-the-shoulders of industry software 
engineers. Government SW engineers must have hands-on development responsibility in 
order to maintain expertise. 
Future State: SW Acquisition Goals 
The primary goal is to improve the DoD/Navy’s ability to consistently deliver high 
quality SW intensive weapon systems that fully meet the warfighters’ needs, while also 
delivering these systems in both a timely and cost effective manner.   
A second major goal, as shown in Figure 6, is to achieve truly Open Architected 
systems and move from stove-pipe, proprietary, redundant and non-common systems 
towards product line multi-platform non-proprietary common reusable systems and software 
components. Achieving truly OA systems will improve system quality, promote competition 




















Figure 6. Open Architecture Goal 
Future State: Team-Based SW Acquisition Approach 
In order to achieve these major goals, the DoD/Navy must reconstitute and maintain 
a sufficient level of SW expertise with the applied experience required to team with Industry 
and address the numerous SW development technical challenges.  Figures 7 and 8 
comprise a high-level model of an alternative SW acquisition approach that enables the 
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Figure 8. Government SW Development 
The key differences between this SW acquisition approach and the typical approach 
is that the government SW engineers are responsible for developing and delivering a subset 
of the mission critical tactical system and software components. Government in-house SW 
engineers are responsible for developing and delivering the associated technical artifacts for 
their SW components, including requirements specifications, architecture and design 
documents, code, and test procedures.  Note that Industry will still develop the vast majority 
of the SW components and artifacts.  
The government SW engineers are also responsible for providing the critical 
management products as well including development process documents, metrics, 
schedules, cost/schedule progress (EVMS), interdependencies, and risks. This is required to 
develop and maintain in-house SW SMEs with the applied experience required to be able to 
successfully architect, design, and manage (accurately estimate and track cost, schedule, 
and risk) the software development effort at all levels of software intensive system 
decomposition (Functional Domain, Component, Segment, CSCI, and down to the CSCI 
sub-component Object and Class level). 
The government SW engineers are given the opportunity to provide SW prototypes 




12Pre - Decisional Distribution Statement F: Release is not authorized; Further dis semination is only directed by NSWCDD or higher authority. 
Open Architecture Initiative


































- Transition from Stove - Pipes to Product Lines
- Reduce Cost 
- Promote Competition & Innovation 
- Deliver High Quality Reliable Systems
Non - Common 
System & SW Growth
Non - Common 
System & SW Growth
Non - Common 




OA based objective architecture that: 
Decouples Hardware from Software 
Utilizes Standards -based Interfaces to Network
Componentizes Software Applications 
Operating System / Hard Ware
Decouple
H/W from S/WMiddle Ware
Gov’t ’  owns 
the System Arch,
Software Arch, and 
Interfaces
* Promotes Cost 
Avoidance and 
Innovation
Gov’t’ owns  the 
engineering 
artifacts in the 
CAL
Current- Platform Based Development
TTWCS 
CS Integrator
Prime Sys Integ 
SEWIP



















Critical Functional Domain Component






Gov’t    develops a small subset of the sw components to invest in the 
gov’ t acquisition workforce at no additional cost to the programs
Gov’t    contracts out modular components to promote competition 













Computer SW Configuration Item (CSCI)
- Lead CSCI Architecture Design and Code
- Cross Discipline IPT participation
- Complex Tech Problem Resolution
Segment and Component Level Development
- Lead Architecture Design and Implementation
- Cross Organization/Function IPT Leadership and Participation
- Lead Technology insertion
1 to 2 years
Program & Line Management: 
Department Head (500+)
Program Managers for PEOs
Technical Leadership and Oversight
Systems and Domain Level
- AoA Leadership and Execution
-Cost and Schedule Assessment
-Tech Approach Leadership & Approval
Senior Level SW Experts
Domain and System Level LeadershipLine and Program Management Path
Technical Path
Management: Component Level 
Branch (25 to 40) Head
Management: System(s) Level
Division (100 to 250) Head










2 to 8 years
Management: CSCI(s) Level






Maintaining Navy in-house SW expertise requires that 
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house. There is no well defined criteria or process for 
assigning sw development to in-house engineers.
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The SW artifacts (requirement specs, design documents, code, etc.) are developed 
by Integrated Government and Industry SW development teams that utilize cross 
organizational design/code peer reviews to ensure high quality products and conformance to 
best-practices.  
The government SW Development engineers have the same expectations and 
requirements relative to cost, schedule and technical performance as their industry peers. 
System testing is performed by an independent government team with a separate 
management chain of command from the government SW team. 
By assigning actual SW development responsibility to in-house engineers, the 
government can reconstitute and maintain the SW expertise pipe-line as shown in figure 9, 
and thereby develop the senior level SW expertise required to perform as peer level team-
mates with Industry. This approach will provide in-house software SMEs that maintain 
applied experience and corporate knowledge (as the system evolves and as some of the 
component development is conducted by different industry organizations over time) with: 
 Complex system and software functional requirements such as: Safety critical, 
Mission critical, Complex external and internal interfaces, Real-time processing 
Security sensitive data processing, and Complex algorithms; 
 Latest software technologies and methodologies; and  
 Applied open architecture (modular, scalable, reusable, maintainable, and 














                                       
Figure 9. SW Expertise Pipeline Future State: Success Examples 
The alternative government and industry SW development team acquisition 
approach described in the previous section has been successfully utilized for over 50 years 
by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for various strategic and 
tactical weapon and fire control missile and gun systems. For example, NSWCDD 





designing, coding and testing of many of the most critical and complex (e.g., safety critical,  
real-time, highly complex algorithms, external and internal interface functionality) software 
components for programs such as the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System 
(TTWCS).  
The government SW engineers have successfully worked with private industry SW 
engineers as an integrated SW development team. The cost, schedule, and technical 
performance of these SW IPTs have been consistently exceptional over multiple decades as 
compared to the vast majority of complex weapon system programs that have relied 
primarily on industry for the SW development and have failed (per the references and 
metrics provided previously). The TTWCS SW IPT has been consistently successful in 
meeting the SW technical challenges and future state goals as previously described in this 
paper. Some specific examples are provided in the following paragraphs. 
Over the past several decades, the TTWCS  SW IPT has consistently successfully 
delivered software upgraded  to incorporate and integrate the latest SW technologies; 
evolving from Mil-spec processors (ROLM 1666) to modern processors (HP744, X86); from 
mil-spec operating system (RMX/RDOS) to open system OS (LINUX); from first generation 
programming languages (Assembly, Fortran) to modern languages (Ada, Java, C, C++). 
The SW IPT has successfully incorporated new SW development methodologies; 
transitioning from functional design to object-oriented design, from waterfall development to 
spiral/increment development; from human-only generated coding to graphic-user-interface 
and auto-code generation tools; from point-to-point interfaces to FDDI/ETHERNET H/W and 
SOA-based SW interfaces.  
The TTWCS IP has achieved and demonstrated Open Architecture design and 
implementation. As shown in Figure 10, the TTWCS SW engineers utilized object-oriented 
design to achieve scalability and reusability with regards to the goal of easily interfacing with 
multiple platforms and their unique launching systems. The TTWCS System has been easily 
upgraded to support not just US Surface Ship Vertical Launching Systems, but also US 
Submarine and United Kingdom Royal Navy Submarine platforms. When the TTWC system 
was recently upgraded to interface with the SSGN platform, within less than a year the 
government SW engineers were able to define the SW req’s, document the design 
modifications, implement and test the associated new Launcher Interface code changes. In 
addition, SW Components were reused from the TTWCS SW within the SSGN Launching 
System software which resulted in a faster than usual successful integration of the two 
systems. 
The TTWCS system has successfully met interdependency deliveries with the 
Tomahawk missile segment upgrades and passed the vast majority of its Initial Operational 
Test Events.  
The resulting quality of the TTWCS SW has been consistently high with the 
integrated SW meeting all KPPs and with SW quality consistently averaging little over 1 
Defect/KSLOC. And more importantly, the TTWCS software developed by the government 
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Figure 10. Open Architecture Design 
In addition to working for the large (multi-million source lines of code), multi-year 
TTWCS development effort; the industry and government SW team approach has also been 
demonstrated to also work well for rapid development efforts. Government engineers have 
teamed with industry to utilize agile SW development methodology to successfully deliver 
the integrated sensor and weapon capabilities for marine/army vehicles such as Gunslinger, 
Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP), and Wolfpack. This integrated agile development 
team has also been utilized for the Naval Expeditionary Overwatch (NEO) Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. These rapid development efforts were 
lead by government engineers that quickly assessed and integrated multi-vendor hardware 
and software technologies to provide the deployed warfighters with much needed 
capabilities that met emergent mission critical needs. 
Future State: Team-Based SW Development Benefits 
As demonstrated by the consistent success of the TTWCS, SLBM, and Rapid 
Development weapon programs highlighted in the previous section, the government and 
industry SW development team model is not just a theory. There are many benefits to 
utilizing this SW acquisition approach. The senior level government SW engineers are 
capable of working with industry to address the significant SW challenges that include: 
 Designing and implementing truly Open Architected systems that fully meet the 
goals of standardized interfaces, scalability, reliability, portability, modularity and reusability; 





 Successfully assessing and rapidly integrating the most advanced software 
technologies and methodologies into the SW development processes, 
environments and systems.  
 Successfully integrating the complex mix of legacy SW components, new 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) SW and hardware components and 
DoD/Navy developed highly specialized SW components to provide integrated 
net-centric systems that can execute as systems-of-systems and fully meet 
mission level objectives and KPPs. 
 Delivering systems with demonstrated Information Assurance (IA) and protection 
against SW-based Cyber-Attacks, while maximizing the utilization of COTS and 
Net-Centric architectures. 
In addition to addressing the technical challenges above, the reconstitution of in-
house SW expertise will also enable mitigation of the following key problems identified in the 
ASN/RDA SPII SAM AS-IS and T0-BE State Reports.   
 The Program Offices will have access to in-house SW experts with the technical 
and acquisition process experience to aid the program offices in managing the 
industry development teams. 
 The in-house experts will have the applied knowledge to assess industry 
technical approaches and also their SW development processes. This includes 
having in-house experience and metrics from SW cost and schedule estimates 
and thereby be able to provide support for independent cost and schedule 
assessments. 
 The in-house SW experts will have applied experience with developing and 
implementing system requirements at all levels, and this will enable them to 
support requirement management and volatility risk reduction.  
 The government SW engineers will have in-depth knowledge of various weapon 
system architectures and maintain the corporate knowledge required to mitigate 
the risk of program office leadership and personnel turnover. 
 The in-house SW engineers will have applied experience with EVMS and can aid 
the program offices in setting up realistic and meaningful SW-based EVMS 
processes and tools. 
 By maintaining SW engineers with applied experience in both previous and 
current complex SW development efforts, the program offices will have a source 
of objective lessons learned and metrics that can be applied to future SW 
development process improvement.    
Another challenge of relying on private industry for 100% of the software 
development is that it leaves the program office with no leverage over the contractor; and 
with very few schedule, cost or performance risk mitigation strategies when the private 
contractor is failing to meet the program needs. By the time the program office realizes the 
contractor has significant problems, the program is in “too deep” with that company to have 
any other choice than to continue funding the poor performing contractor and hope for the 
best.  
Firing the contractor and transferring the work to another private industry contractor 






 Significantly increasing funding 
 Significantly delaying the schedule 
 Significantly reducing or eliminating planned capabilities 
 Canceling the program 
By establishing and maintaining integrated SW development teams, the program 
office leadership will have the option to augment the contractor SW team with on-site 
government SW engineers, or transfer the responsibility for SW component development 
from the contractor to the Government. This can be accomplished easily as the Government 
software engineers are part of the software development team from the beginning.   There 
will be no need to perform a costly re-competition to assign the work to another private 
industry team that would be unfamiliar with the program requirements and plan. Under the 
proposed new software acquisition strategy, the Government would have contracts in place 
that specify all developed system artifacts become the property of the US Government. This 
mitigation technique only accelerates the delivery. There is of course still some added 
schedule risk as the in-house team must work with the contractor to transfer all necessary 
artifacts to assume full development responsibility. If the program office and development 
items established an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) however, this transfer of 
artifact responsibility is relatively easy. 
Program offices will also have the option of directing the Government in-house 
software experts to provide onsite support to aid the contractor in recovering schedule 
progress or resolving technical problems.  Given the DoD approach for rotating the military 
leaders to gain a wide range of experiences, it is common for a software intensive system to 
have acquisition program leadership personnel that have no significant training or, more 
importantly, any applied experience in software engineering. A closely related challenge is 
that acquisition program office leadership transition may occur at any point during the 
system development effort.  
A single Program manager may not manage the system acquisition and 
development program from the beginning (version content definition) completely through to 
the end (through IOC). The development organizations are faced with the challenge of still 
meeting the previously defined development milestones and delivery dates, while 
simultaneously changing organizational structures, reporting chain of commands, tasking 
priority changes, funding reallocation, and development process changes directed by the 
new leadership.  Maintaining an experienced Government SW development organization 
mitigates the impact of frequent senior leadership changes. The experienced SW 
development team can provide the following benefits to the acquisition office’s new 
leadership: 
 Maintain critical system functional, architectural, and design corporate knowledge 
 Aid the new leadership in quickly coming up to speed on the history of the 
program, the system’s architecture and functionality, the various development 
organization’s roles and responsibilities, current development process, and 
status of the current development efforts (schedule, progress, and risk) 
 Provide impact assessment for proposed organizational and/or process changes 
 Perform the Technical Authority responsibilities for those leaders without 





Future State: Establishing the Pipe-Line 
The DoD/Navy must re-assume leadership of software architecture and design. 
Government software architecture and technical authority must be demonstrated not just at 
the highest system composition level (i.e., Objective Architecture Functional Domain level), 
but must extend down into lower critical sub-component levels as well as illustrated in Figure 
10.  In-house software SMEs should serve as the software technical authority and the 
software architects, and lead critical software sub-element development IPTs.  
The DoD/Navy must develop and document a software acquisition improvement 
vision with a quantifiable goal. Critical weapon and warfare system program offices should 
work with the in-house software development organizations to develop transition plans to 
achieve the vision goals.  This software expertise pipeline must be continually fed and 
maintained. In order to attract and keep the best and brightest software engineers, the 
Government must offer: 
 Challenging software development and leadership responsibilities 
 Opportunities of architecting, designing and implementing solutions to the most 
complex types of system functional capabilities and problems 
 Opportunities to utilize the latest software technologies, methodologies, 
processes, tools 
Government engineers should not be limited to developing tactical software only 
(where tactical software is defined as software utilized with delivered warfighting systems 
with strategic or tactical mission critical requirements). They must stay abreast and have 
applied expertise with all the latest software technologies.  In addition to performing tactical 
SW development, another way to achieve this goal is to assign non-tactical (e.g., system or 
architecture modeling software, simulation software, testing software, media generation 
software, data distribution software) to in-house engineers.  It is often possible to use the 
latest software development technologies and methodologies for non-tactical software as 
the acquisition cycle may be much shorter and the certification process less stringent than 
for tactical systems 
Development of non-tactical and non-critical software components can serve as a 
test bed and as a cost, schedule, and technical performance risk mitigation strategy for 
determining if new software technology is of sufficient maturity and capability to be 
incorporated into the current or next version of critical tactical system(s).  The two key 
questions that must be addressed when determining what software should be assigned to a 
Government software development organization are:  
1. Will this assignment help maintain the software expertise pipeline? 
1. Will this assignment maintain corporate expertise and mitigate the 
cost, schedule, and/or technical performance risks of existing or future 
systems?   
As directed in the 2008 Mr. Donald Winter SECDEF memo: "This combination of 
personnel reductions and reduced RDT&E has seriously eroded the Department's domain 
knowledge and produced an over-reliance on contractors to perform core in-house technical 
functions. This environment has lead to outsourcing the "hands-on" work that is needed in-
house, to acquire the Nations best science and engineering talent and to equip them to 





weapons systems in a responsible manner, it is imperative the DoN maintain technical 
domain expertise at all levels of the acquisition infrastructure." 
The current undefined, undocumented, non-standardized, and non-disciplined “ad 
hoc” assignment of SW development to in-house SW development organizations is 
insufficient to achieve and maintain the much needed SW expertise pipe-line. The 
DoD/Navy should develop a well defined and documented software development 
assessment and assignment process and criteria. This process and criteria will be utilized by 
software intensive system acquisition program offices to assign software development 
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